The trap of treating terrorism as a geographical matter
There’s been a lot of talk these past few weeks about domestic terrorism, which is a term they’re using to distinguish acts of terrorism p
erformed within our national borders and against citizens of our nation from acts of terrorism performed elsewhere in the world against “our people.” While I understand there may be some interest, and likely some value too, in drawing a distinction between domestic and international terrorism, I also think that the tendency to “locate” terrorism in some physical place is a remnant of the pre-911 world, which sometimes inhibits our ability to conceive of, and find effective ways of combating, “modern day” terrorism.
I remember when and how hard it struck me – that one of the big paradigm shifts resulting from the events of Sept. 11, 2001, was a broad realization that the wars of the future (which as of that day became the all-too-real present) would not be fought on battlefields, and that our enemies could not be identified as representing or belonging to a specific country, and that the leaders of our enemies (might but then again) might not be heads of state, or military or governmental leaders. (That’s because terrorists generally don’t have much regard for government, regardless of which government, or which country.)
Unlike Pearl Harbor, say, where everyone knew Japan attacked the United States, and the United States, in turn, declared war on Japan, no one could pinpoint 9-11 or say this country or that country was responsible, which is what made prompt and effective military response so difficult. We were looking all around going, “where the heck are they, and who are they,” meaning our enemies. Despite our thinking that they all looked a particular way, the only thing they really had in common was hatred for our lifestyle and our values, or – in their view – our lack of values in the face of money – which is why, supposedly, they targeted the World Trade Center in the attack, for it symbolized the commercial and financial heart of America. They also targeted the Pentagon, the seat of our military power, – which spoke to their contempt for (what they believe is) our belief – that [military] might is right.
Analysts called it an ideological war, and I would ask – as opposed to, what, one having to do solely with money? … land? … power? (When’s the last time you saw one of those, except on the gang-ridden streets of our inner cities, or in the contemporary civil wars in Africa?) I would look around at so many different instances of brutality and killing, and ask – what distinguishes terrorism from plain old run-of the-mill crime and violence? The answer has to do with the aims of the perpetrator(s) of the violence, and whether they are trying to make some political, religious or ideological statement. In this light, much more than has been called terrorism would, could, and should rightly qualify as terrorism.
The problem with designating terrorism as domestic or international is that it treats terrorism as a geographical matter, and would seek to place the cause of it in some physical locations rather than in the deranged minds of deranged people. If we don’t change the way that we think of terrorism then we also don’t change the way we attempt to combat it, thus, ending up using brute force from some stationary position when perhaps some other more enlightened technique or variable approach might be more effective.
It’s the equivalent of thinking that a phone call coming in from a particular phone number means that the call was placed by a person who, physically, must be in the geographic location that corresponds to the particular area code prefix – which, in this era of cell phones and digital and satellite technology, we know, is simply not the case.
Ron Colone can be reached at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it


